We consider the transfer pricing decision for a multidivisional …rm with an upstream division and multiple downstream divisions. The downstream divisions can independently determine their retail prices, and decide on whether or not they will purchase from the upstream division at negotiated transfer prices. To allocate the …rm-wide pro…t between upstream and downstream divisions, we construct a cooperative game, show the convexity of the game, and then compute the Shapley value-based transfer prices for the …rm.
Introduction
The transfer pricing problem is of signi…cant importance to multidivisional …rms which need to consider the allocation of …rm-wide pro…t between an upstream division and multiple downstream divisions. In such transfer pricing problems, all divisions of a …rm can independently make their decisions as if they were operating in a decentralized setting. This means that all downstream divisions can determine their own retail prices, and decide on whether or not they will buy from the upstream division at negotiated transfer prices. For details regarding the transfer pricing decision in multidivisional …rms, see online Appendix A.
In this paper, we consider the transfer pricing decisions of a multidivisional …rm where the upstream and downstream divisions negotiate the transfer price that results in a fair allocation of the maximum system-wide pro…t surplus among three or more divisions. The downstream divisions then determine their retail prices. In this paper, to re ‡ect the fact that customers are sensitive to retail prices, we assume that the demand in the market a downstream division serves is dependent on the division's retail pricing decision. We learn from Göx and Schiller [7] that most transfer pricing publications assumed the demand to be independent of the retail price, i.e., a constant ; and we …nd that only a few recent publications (e.g., Arya and Mittendorf [1] , Baldenius and Reichelstein [2] ) used a linear, deterministic, price-dependent demand function for transfer pricing problems.
We assume that the upstream division's unit production cost is not a constant but a decreasing, convex function of the production quantity-i.e., the downstream division's order quantity, or the demand faced by the downstream division. Such a modeling approach renders our model and analysis more realistic, because it is consistent with the wide existence of "economies of scale,"see, e.g., Lingnau [12] . The quantity-dependent cost function also distinguishes our paper from other transfer pricing papers.
In reality, the upstream division of a multidivisional …rm usually sells its intermediate products to multiple downstream divisions that are located in di¤erent marketing areas. In Section 2, we analyze the transfer pricing decisions for such a system by using cooperative game theory. We believe that this is an appropriate methodology for our transfer-pricing analysis because all downstream divisions of a multidivisional …rm are "free" to determine whether or not they will buy from the upstream division at negotiated transfer prices. Speci…cally, each division is able to decide on whether it will trade with the upstream division in a non-cooperative setting or in a cooperative setting. In the noncooperative setting, the upstream and downstream members make their transfer prices and retail prices in Stackelberg equilibrium, respectively. In the cooperative setting, the downstream members choose the globally-optimal retail prices that maximize the system-wide pro…t, and negotiate transfer prices with the upstream member. In order to guarantee that the downstream members are willing to adopt the globally-optimal retail prices, we will use cooperative game theory to …nd the negotiated transfer prices assuring that the downstream members are better (by achieving more pro…ts) in the cooperative setting than in the non-cooperative setting.
Therefore, for the multidivisional …rm with a single upstream division and n downstream divisions with n 2, we construct an (n + 1)-division cooperative game in characteristic function form, and prove that the characteristic value function is supermodular, that is, the game is convex and thus superadditive. We also show that our game has a non-empty core, and use the concept of Shapley value (Shapley [15] ) to …nd a unique allocation scheme. Note that Shapley value is a proper concept for our analysis because it is in the core due to the convexity of our game. We then calculate n transfer prices for the n downstream divisions, using the Shapley value-based allocation scheme. Our proofs for all theorems and corollaries are delegated to online Appendices C and D, respectively.
An important contribution of our paper to the literature is the application of n-player cooperative game theory (with n 3) to transfer pricing problems. To the best of our knowledge, very few transfer pricing-related publications (for example, Rosenthal [14] ) applied this important methodology. Our model di¤ers from [14] because of the following three facts: (i) As mentioned above, we consider the quantity-dependent production cost and the price-sensitive demand functions; Rosenthal [14] assumed a constant production cost and a deterministic demand.
(ii) We investigate the two-echelon system involving a single upstream division and multiple downstream divisions, whereas Rosenthal [14] considered an n-echelon (n 3) system in which there is a single division at each level. (iii) We compute the …rm-wide pro…t surplus as the di¤erence between the pro…t in the cooperative setting and that in the non-cooperative setting. In [14] , each division's pro…t in the non-cooperative setting was assumed to be zero; thus, each player's pro…t surplus was equal to the player's pro…t in the cooperative setting.
Transfer Pricing Decisions
In this section, we investigate the transfer pricing problem for a two-echelon system (multidivisional …rm) involving an upstream division U and n 2 downstream divisions (i.e., D j , j = 1; 2; : : : ; n). Such a system is very common in practice. For example, Ford Motor Company's Struandale engine plant in South Africa (an upstream division) supplies the Duratorq TDCi diesel engines to the …rm's global assembly plants (multiple downstream divisions) which make the Ford Ranger pick-up trucks [5] . Those assembly plants are actually "free" to decide on whether they can buy from the plant in South Africa at negotiated transfer prices in the cooperative setting or at non-cooperative (Stackelberg equilibrium) transfer prices. Walmart's o¢ ce "GP USA Export"at its Arkansas headquarters (an upstream division), as a branch of the Walmart Global Procurement, is mainly responsible to purchase and sell quality U.S.
products to its global stores, which are allowed to negotiate transfer prices with headquarters in the cooperative setting or buy at the transfer prices in the non-cooperative (Stackelberg game) setting [20] .
In the multidivisional …rm under study, the upstream division U sells its intermediate products-
which are identical to each other-to n 2 downstream divisions. We assume that, to improve the …rm-wide performance, the n divisions D j (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n) are located in, and serve, n di¤erent markets to reduce the possibility of competition between two, or among three or more, downstream divisions.
Each division is "free" to decide on whether it trades with other divisions in a non-cooperative setting or in a cooperative setting. In the non-cooperative setting, the upstream division U …rst announces its transfer price to the downstream divisions D j (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n), who then respond by determining their retail prices. For this "sequential-move" scenario, divisions U and D j act as the "leader" and the "follower," respectively; accordingly, we need to …nd Stackelberg equilibrium to characterize the two echelons'decisions. In the cooperative setting, the n + 1 divisions-including the upstream division U and n 2 downstream divisions-jointly make their decisions to maximize the system-wide pro…t that is the sum of all divisions'pro…ts.
In order to entice n + 1 divisions to cooperate, the multidivisional …rm should divide the pro…t surplus-which is the di¤erence between the system-wide pro…t in the cooperative setting and that in the non-cooperative setting-under a fair allocation scheme that is acceptable to all divisions. To do so, we develop a cooperative game model in characteristic-function form, and use the solution concepts of core and Shapley value to determine a fair allocation scheme and calculate the transfer price between the upstream division U and each downstream division. Note that, since there are n 2 downstream divisions, we need to determine n transfer prices.
Next, we develop the pro…t functions for divisions U and D j (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n). Division D j (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n) makes its retail pricing decision p j and sells q j (p j ) units of its …nal products to serve market j. Similar to [1] and [2] , division D j 's sales quantity is determined by the deterministic, linear demand function q j (p j ) = a j b j p j with a j ; b j > 0 and p j a j =b j . Note that all downstream members face independent demands [i.e., q j (p j ) (for j = 1; 2; : : : ; n) are independent of each other], because they are located in di¤erent marketing areas, as assumed in Section 1. Thus, this division's pro…t j (p j ) is calculated as,
where T j denotes the transfer price that division D j pays to division U .
Since division U sells its intermediate products to serve all of n downstream divisions, division U 's total sale quantity is Q(q) P n j=1 q j (p j ), where q (q 1 (p 1 ); : : : ; q n (p n )). As discussed in Section 1, this division's unit production cost is dependent on the production quantity, because of the existence of economies of scale, for details, see, e.g., Lingnau [12] . Hence, the unit production cost-which is incurred by division U when this division makes Q(q) units of intermediate products-can be written as c(Q(q)). We assume that c( ) is a decreasing, convex function of the production quantity; that is, c 0 ( ) 0 and c 00 ( ) 0. Moreover, similar to Lingnau [12] , we assume that 1 + b j c 0 ( ) 0, for j = 1; : : : ; n. This means that the system-wide unit pro…t-i.e., the sum of the upstream division's and n downstream divisions'unit pro…ts-is increasing in each downstream division's retail price. For details, see online Appendix B. For other publications involving a linear, decreasing cost function of the quantity, see, for example, Gray et al. [8] , Jaag [10] , and Moorthy [13] . Di¤ering from the above publications, we do not consider any speci…c function but use the general form c(Q(q)) for our analysis.
Division U 's pro…t generated by trading with division D j (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n), denoted by i , is calculated as its sale revenue minus its production cost, i.e., j = T j q j (p j ) c(Q(q))q j (p j ). Total pro…t that division U can realize by trading with n downstream divisions are thus found as,
Cooperative Game Model
We now use multi-person cooperative game theory to solve the transfer pricing problem for n+1 divisions with n 2. Following von Neumann and Morgenstern [19, Ch . VI], we construct a cooperative game in characteristic-function form by computing the characteristic value of each possible coalition, which is de…ned as the minimum pro…t surplus that all divisions in the coalition can guarantee to achieve jointly when all the other divisions form an opposing coalition and try to minimize the pro…t surplus to the coalition. Next, we compute the characteristic values of all possible coalitions. In the empty coalition ?, there is no division and the pro…t surplus is certainly zero. Thus, the characteristic value of the empty coalition is v(?) = 0.
The Characteristic Values of One-Division Coalitions
If division i = U; D 1 ; D 2 ; : : : ; D n does not cooperate with any other division(s), then it forms the onedivision coalition (i), where it is the only member. For our problem, v(i) is the "security-level" pro…t surplus that division i can achieve by itself when other divisions form an opposing coalition.
Theorem 1 For the cooperative game under consideration, we always have v(U ) = 0. If 2c 0 (Q) + c 00 (Q)Q 0 for any production quantity Q, then the characteristic value of each single-division coalition must be zero, i.e., v(i) = 0, for i = D j (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n).
The above theorem indicates that whether v(D i ) = 0 (for i = 1; : : : ; n) depends on the condition 2c 0 (Q) + c 00 (Q)Q 0 for any production quantity Q. We note that, if the upstream division U 's unit production cost c( ) is speci…ed as a linear, decreasing function as in Gray et al. [8] , Jaag [10] , and Moorthy [13] , then c 0 ( ) < 0 and c 00 ( ) = 0, and thus, the condition that 2c 0 (Q) + c 00 (Q)Q 0 must be satis…ed. To facilitate our analysis, we hereafter assume that 2c 0 (Q) + c 00 (Q)Q 0 for any production quantity Q.
The Characteristic Values of k-Division Coalitions with k 2
We calculate the characteristic value of the k-division coalition C k (2 k n + 1), in which k divisions trade in the cooperative setting. When k = n + 1, C k = C n+1 , which is called the grand coalition in which all of n + 1 divisions cooperate. We note that the coalition C k may or may not include the
otherwise, all of k members in C k are downstream divisions.
To …nd the characteristic value v(C k ), we need to calculate the minimum pro…t surplus that the k members in C k jointly achieve by their own e¤orts. Hence, we should consider the impact of the decisions of the other (n k + 1) divisions-who are not in the coalition C k -on total pro…t of the k members in C k . As discussed previously, we calculate the value of v(C k ), assuming that the (n k + 1)
divisions (that are not in C k ) do not cooperate but behave in the non-cooperative setting-where the upstream division U acts as the leader and the downstream divisions that are not in C k act as the followers-and choose the transfer prices in Stackelberg equilibrium. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we …nd that, if division U is not in the k-division coalition C k , then the pro…t surplus of each member
downstream divisions are in C k and thus, there are C n k 1 = n!=[(k 1)!(n k + 1)!] possible k-division coalitions, which are denoted by C r k , r = 1; 2; : : : ; C n k 1 . Note that the upstream division U and the …nd Stackelberg equilibria for the divisions U and D j = 2 C r k , we use the following three steps. In the …rst step, given the retail price p (k;r) j , we maximize the upstream division U 's pro…t in (2) to …nd its best-response transfer price. In the second step, we substitute the best-response transfer price into the (1), and maximize it to obtain D j 's Stackelberg equilibriumcharacterized retail price asp
where Q(q; k; r) P
denoting the retail price of division D i in the coalition C r k . In the third step, we substitutep (k;r) j into the upstream division U 's best response function, and obtain the transfer price in Stackelberg equilibriumT
Next, we calculate the characteristic value v(C r k ). In the coalition C r k , division U and the (k 1) downstream divisions cooperate to jointly determine the optimal retail pricing decisions (i.e., p
, which is given as,
Theorem 2 Consider the k-division (3 k n + 1) coalition C r k (r = 1; 2; : : : ; C n k 1 ) including the upstream division U and the (k 1) downstream divisions. The downstream divisions'optimal retail prices p
where Q (q; k; r) P
). We also …nd that the upstream division U 's transfer pricesT
that is paid by the downstream divisions D j = 2 C r k can be obtained by substituting Q (q; k; r) into (3). Moreover, the characteristic value v(C r k ) is calculated as,
Note that in (6),Q(q)
i )=(2b i ) (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n) respectively denote the upper division U 's and downstream division D i 's Stackelberg equilibria when U trades with each downstream division in the non-cooperative setting. We can also …nd that, under the assumption that 2c 0 (Q) + c 00 (Q)Q 0 for any production quantity Q, both p
This means that, if more downstream divisions join a coalition, then the optimal retail prices of all downstream divisions in the coalition and the upstream division U 's Stackelberg transfer prices to the
c(Q (q; k; r))] of divisions U and D i is increasing in k; but, the pro…t margin is a convex function of q i (p
Similarly, we …nd that, if division
is increasing in k, but it is a convex function of q j (p
We …nd that, in most relevant publications such as [8] , [10] , and [13] , the authors assumed the linearity of the function c( ), which implies c 000 ( ) = 0. In our paper, we do not impose a speci…c form on the function c( ) for our game analysis but only assume that it is decreasing and convex with the property c 000 ( ) 0.
We note that, when k = n+1, division U and all downstream divisions form the grand coalition C n+1
to jointly make their globally-optimal decisions. Following Theorem 2, we …nd that the characteristic value v(C n+1 )-which denotes the pro…t surplus generated when all divisions of the multidivisional …rm cooperate-can be written as v(
i )g, which is the sum of all divisions' pro…t surpluses. We also …nd that v(C n+1 ) 0, because, according to Corollary 1, total pro…t surplus of division U and the downstream division
Corollary 2 The characteristic value v(C r k ) is an increasing function of k; i.e., as more divisions join a coalition to cooperate, they can jointly realize a higher pro…t surplus.
Pro…t Allocation and Transfer Prices
The characteristic values [v(?); v(i), i = U; D 1 ; D 2 ; : : : ; D n ; v(C k ), 2 k n+1]-that we computed in Section 2.1-constitute the (n + 1)-division cooperative game model G for our transfer pricing problem involving division U and n divisions D j (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n). It is interesting-and, we think, importantto determine whether or not our cooperative game in characteristic-function form is superadditive and convex ; for more information about superadditive and convex games, see, for example, Stra¢ n [17] .
Since any convex cooperative game must be superadditive, we subsequently show the convexity of our game. To do so, we need to examine the supermodularity of the characteristic function, because a cooperative game is convex and also superadditive if its characteristic function is supermodular (Shapley [16] ).
Theorem 3 For our (n + 1)-division cooperative game, the characteristic function is supermodular; thus, the game G is convex and also superadditive.
As Theorem 3 implies, when more divisions form a coalition, the characteristic value of the coalition is higher. It thus follows that all divisions in our (n + 1)-player cooperative game in characteristicfunction form should have the incentive to join the grand coalition C n+1 . This means that the grand coalition C n+1 is stable if v(C n+1 ) is allocated to all divisions in a fair manner. Next, we consider the fair allocation of the characteristic value (total pro…t surplus) v(C n+1 ). We let y U denote the pro…t surplus allocated to division U , and y D j denote the surplus allocated to division D j (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n).
Using y i , for i = U; D 1 ; D 2 ; : : : ; D n , we can characterize a proper allocation scheme by using an (n + 1)-tuple of numbers y (y U ; y D 1 ; y D 2 ; : : : ; y Dn ) with the following two properties: (i) individual rationality, i.e., y i v(i) = 0, for all i 2 C n+1 = (U; D 1 ; D 2 ; : : : ; D n ); (ii) collective rationality, i.e., P i2C n+1
; see Stra¢ n [17] . In cooperative game theory there are a number of concepts that could be used for our analysis of the (n + 1)-player cooperative game in characteristic form. As Leng and Parlar [11] described, one of the most important concepts is the core (Gillies [6] ).
Theorem 4 For our (n + 1)-division cooperative game, the core is non-empty.
As the above theorem indicates, any point in the non-empty core represents a fair allocation scheme.
To …nd a unique allocation solution, we next focus on the fair allocation in terms of the Shapley value [15] , which is the unique imputation (y U ; y D 1 ; y D 2 ; : : : ; y Dn ) where the payo¤s y i (i = U; D 1 ; D 2 ; : : : ; D n ) are distributed "fairly"by an "arbitrator."Note that, in this paper, the headquarters of the multidivisional …rm act as the arbitrator; in fact, as Göx and Schiller [7] reviewed, in many transfer pricing-related publications, the headquarters were assumed to be responsible for the coordination of all divisions.
Theorem 5 For the downstream division D j (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n), the Shapley value y D j is calculated as
where v(C r k (U; D j )) and v(C r k (U; D j ) fD j g) can be calculated by using (6) . For the upstream division U , the Shapley value y U is calculated as
Next, we use the Shapley value given in the above theorem to compute the transfer prices for n downstream divisions D j (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n), which is shown in this following theorem.
Theorem 6
The transfer price T j (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n)-that division D j pays to division U -is calculated as,
whereT
and y D j can be computed by using Theorems 2 and 5.
To illustrate our above analysis, we provide the following numerical example. The upstream division U 's unit production cost function is given as c(Q(q)) = 5 0:01Q(q), where
We can calculate the characteristic values for all possible coalitions, as speci…ed in online Appendix E, and thus develop our cooperative game as follows: We learn from the above example that the pro…t surpluses (y D j , for j = 1; 2; 3) allocated to three downstream divisions depend on di¤erent values of three divisions' demand parameters (i.e., a j and b j ). Speci…cally, we note that, if the downstream division j has a larger value of the ratio a j =b j , then the division should gain more allocations, which is possibly attributed to the following reason:
Equation (5) shows that, in the grand coalition C n+1 , a larger value of a j =b j will result in a higher retail price p
for the downstream division j (compared with other divisions), because the value of c(Q (q; n + 1)) + c 0 (Q (q; n + 1))Q (q; n + 1) is the same to all downstream divisions. As discussed in Section 2.1.2, the system-wide unit pro…t is
, where the division j with a higher retail price p (n+1) j makes a larger contribution. This may lead the Shapley value to suggest a higher pro…t surplus allocated to the division j. Noting that the inverse form of our linear demand function is p j = a j =b j q j (p j )=b j , we …nd that a j =b j can be interpreted as the upper limit for division j's retail price. Thus, we conclude from the above that a downstream division with a higher upper limit for its retail price should obtain a larger allocation of the system-wide pro…t surplus.
Conclusions
In this paper, we consider the transfer pricing decisions for a multidivisional …rm with a single upstream division and multiple downstream divisions. The upstream division manufactures its intermediate products and incurs a quantity-dependent production cost, and each downstream division uses the intermediate products to make …nal products and satisfy the retail price-sensitive demand. We compute the …rm-wide pro…t surplus as the pro…t in the cooperative setting minus that in the non-cooperative setting, construct an (n + 1)-division cooperative game model, and use cooperative game theory to fairly allocate the pro…t surplus among three or more divisions. We show that, as more divisions join a coalition to cooperate, each downstream division's retail price decreases. Moreover, we prove that the characteristic function of the cooperative game is supermodular, which means that our game is convex and superadditive. We also show that the core of this game is non-empty. Then, we compute Shapley value for our game to …nd a unique, fair allocation scheme, which is in the core because of the convexity of our game. Thus, the allocation scheme suggested by the Shapley value can assure the stability of the grand coalition. Using the Shapley value, we …nd analytical transfer-pricing decisions that the n downstream divisions pay to the upstream division. In this paper, the application of cooperative game theory with three or more players to transfer pricing analysis is our most important contribution; this modeling approach is expected to help other cooperation-related research projects.
Online Supplements "Transfer Pricing in a Multidivisional Firm: A Cooperative Game Analysis" M. Leng and M. Parlar
Appendix A A Brief Description of the Transfer Pricing Decision in Multidivisional Firms
The transfer pricing problem is of signi…cant importance to multidivisional …rms which need to consider the allocation of …rm-wide pro…t between an upstream division and multiple downstream divisions. More precisely, in a multidivisional …rm, an upstream division sells its intermediate products to a downstream division which then makes the …nal products to serve a market. The side-payment from the downstream division to the upstream division is calculated as the transfer price times the downstream division's purchase quantity. Since the upstream division's sales revenue is equal to the downstream division's total purchase cost, the side-payment does not impact the …rm-wide pro…t (i.e., the sum of the two divisions'pro…ts), which only depends on the retail price at which the downstream division serves its market. However, in order to fairly allocate the …rm-wide pro…t between the two divisions, the …rm must make the transfer pricing decision judiciously. Since for each unit of the intermediate product, the downstream division pays the transfer price to the upstream division, a higher transfer price brings more pro…t to the upstream division but a lower transfer price bene…ts the downstream division. When the …rm's upstream and downstream divisions jointly determine the retail price to maximize the …rm-wide pro…t, the …rm must address the critical question of setting the transfer price to allocate the maximum …rm-wide pro…t between the two divisions. 1 It is natural to expect that, in practice, a multidivisional …rm may desire to coordinate its divisions for the maximization of …rm-wide after-tax pro…t through the transfer pricing decision. Speci…cally, if the tax rate for the …rm's downstream division is lower than that for its upstream division, then the …rm may reduce the transfer price to increase the downstream division's taxable pro…t and decrease the upstream division's taxable pro…t. As a result, the …rm's total after-tax pro…t-i.e., the sum of the downstream division's and the upstream division's after-tax pro…ts-rises. (If the upstream division is located in a lower-tax jurisdiction, then increasing the transfer price results in an increase in the …rm's after-tax pro…t.) For example, as upheld by Canada's Federal Court of Appeal, the General Electric Capital Canada Inc. developed a transfer pricing rule to deduct from its income a C$136.4 million fee paid to its U.S. parent. The Walmart store in Bentonville in Arkansas recently reported that the retailer had achieved signi…cant tax savings in 2010, which were largely related to changes in transfer pricing policies in a foreign jurisdiction. For more examples, see, e.g., a recent report [18] by Tax Management Inc., a subsidiary of The Bureau of National A¤airs, Inc.
As observed in the General Electric and Walmart examples, such a transfer pricing decision could result in a loss of tax revenue in a high-tax jurisdiction (province or state), which may thus desire to impose a "fair" transfer pricing rule on multidivisional …rms. To prevent multidivisional …rms from intentionally transferring their pro…ts from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions, all divisions of a …rm can independently make their decisions as if they were operated in a decentralized setting. This means that all downstream divisions are able to determine their own retail prices and decide on whether or not they will buy from the upstream division at negotiated transfer prices. The transfer pricing decision plays a very important role in the operation of a multidivisional …rm, and it has been of interest to accountants, economists, and managers. As Borstell and Hobster (on behalf of Ernst & Young) reported in [3] , 75% of parent and 81% of subsidiary respondents believe that transfer pricing is "absolutely critical" or "very important" to their organizations.
Since a multidivisional …rm should not use transfer pricing as a tool for reducing the …rm's total tax payment, in our models we assume that tax rates in all jurisdictions are approximately equal to each other so that we can exclude the impact of tax rates on a multidivisional …rm's transfer pricing decision. This is in line with most publications on transfer pricing problems which have not considered the tax-related matters. For details, see a recent and fairly complete review by Göx and Schiller [7] who surveyed a large number of transfer-pricing literature starting from Hirshleifer's seminal, standard model [9] .
Appendix B Explanation on the Assumption 1 + b j c 0 ( ) 0
To explain the assumption that 1 + b j c 0 ( ) 0, we show that the sum of the upstream member's and each downstream member's unit pro…ts is increasing in the downstream member's retail price, because the downstream divisions are independent of each other. We consider the downstream division i, which determines its retail price p i . The upstream division's unit pro…t from trading with the division i is calculated as the transfer price T i -paid by the downstream division i to the upstream division-minus the upstream division's unit production cost c(Q(q)), i.e., T i c(Q(q)).
Since the downstream division i pays the transfer price T i to the upstream division and achieves the unit sales revenue p i , the division's unit pro…t is p i T i . Therefore, the total pro…t of the upstream division and the downstream division i is computed as i p i c(Q(q)).
Note that Q(q) is the upstream division's total production quantity, i.e., Q(q) = P n j=1 q j (p j ), where q j (p j ) = a j b j p j (for j = 1; : : : ; n) is the downstream division j's order quantity. For our proof, we re-write Q(q) as the sum of the downstream division i's order quantity and other divisions'quantities, i.e., Q(q) = q i (p i ) + P j6 =i q j (p j ). The …rst-order derivative of i w.r.t. p i can be computed as,
which is greater than or equal to zero, i.e., 1 b j c 0 (Q(q)) 0 (for j = 1; : : : ; n), if and only if i is increasing in p i . Actually, this assumption is reasonable, because a …rm's unit pro…t should be usually increasing in its retail price. But, the …rm's total pro…t is not always increasing in the price, because the sales quantity is usually decreasing in the price.
Appendix C Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1. Since division i may be division U or may be division D j (j = 1; 2; : : : ; n), we need to analyze the impact of cooperation (between two, or among three or more, of the other divisions) on division U and that on division D j . If division i is U who does not cooperate with any other division D j , then whether or not n downstream divisions cooperate does not a¤ect division U 's pro…t, because of the following fact: When k (1 k n) downstream divisions D j (j = 1; 2; : : : ; k) cooperate, we can easily …nd from (1) that these divisions' optimal retail prices maximizing P k i=1 i (p i ) is the same as those maximizing i (p i ) (for i = 1; 2; : : : ; k). Therefore, if i = U , then v(i) = 0.
We next consider the case that division i is a downstream division, e.g., division D n . Then, division U may cooperate with one or more of the other (n 1) downstream divisions (i.e., D j , j = 1; 2; : : : ; n 1). Without loss of generality, we assume that division U cooperates with k (1 k n 1) downstream divisions D z , z = 1; 2; : : : ; k; and as a result, the (k+1)-division coalition C k+1 (U , D z , z = 1; 2; : : : ; k) forms. For this coalition, divisions U and D z (z = 1; 2; : : : ; k) need to determine the k downstream divisions'globally-optimal retail prices p (k+1) z (z = 1; 2; : : : ; k), in which the superscript (k + 1) means that the optimal prices are made when divisions U and D z (z = 1; 2; : : : ; k) form the (k + 1)-division coalition C k+1 . Moreover, since division U also sells its intermediate products to the other (n k 1) downstream divisions (i.e., D j , j = k+1; : : : ; n 1) in the non-cooperative setting, the upstream division should determine its Stackelberg equilibrium transfer prices to division D j (j = k + 1; : : : ; n 1). Thus, we should also determine transfer pricesT (k+1) j (j = k + 1; : : : ; n 1), which denotes the Stackelberg equilibria when divisions U and D z (z = 1; 2; : : : ; k) form the (k + 1)-division coalition C k+1 . The upstream division U 's and the downstream division D j 's Stackelberg equilibria (for j = k + 1; : : : ; n 1) can be respectively calculated as, p, we …nd that the quantity Q (q) in (9)-when division U cooperates with one or more downstream divisions-should be greater than or equal to that when there is no cooperation between U and any downstream division.
We then compute division D n 's pro…t when k downstream divisions D z (z = 1; 2; : : : ; k) cooperate with the upstream division U . We …nd that the optimal transfer price from D n to U iŝ
If 2c 0 (Q) + c 00 (Q)Q 0 for any production quantity Q, we …nd that, when the
is lower thanT n -Stackelberg equilibrium when division U does not cooperate with any downstream division-and the D n 's pro…t (p (k+1) n ) = (a n b nT (k+1) n ) 2 =(4b n ) is thus higher than that when there is no cooperation between division U and any downstream division. This means that division D n bene…ts from the cooperation between divisions U and D z (z = 1; 2; : : : ; k); hence, its characteristic value-division D n 's minimum pro…t surplus-should be zero when divisions U and D z (z = 1; 2; : : : ; k) does not cooperate, i.e., v(D n ) = 0. Similarly, we can …nd that v(D i ) = 0, for i = 1; : : : ; n 1. This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 2. In order to compute v(C r k ), we need to …nd (k 1) optimal retail prices p
) that maximize total pro…t of all members in C r k . Similar to our discussion in Section 2.1.1, we can calculated p (k;r) i as shown in (5), and also foundT (k;r) j as in this theorem. Moreover, we …nd that, under the assumption that 2c 0 (Q) + c 00 (Q)Q 0 for any production quantity Q, then p (k;r) i andT (k;r) j decreases as k rises, which means that if more divisions cooperate, then their retail prices and division U 's transfer prices should be reduced.
Substituting p (4) gives the maximum pro…t as,
Note that the pro…t surplus v(C r k ) is equal to total pro…t (k;r) -when divisions U and D i (i 2 fi j D i 2 C r k g) join C r k to cooperate for maximizing their total pro…t-minus that when these divisions do not cooperate but make their decisions in the non-cooperative setting. In the non-cooperative setting, all divisions that are not in C r k choose their Stackelberg equilibria, and thus, the sum of division U 's and division D i 's (i 2 fi j D i 2 C r k g) pro…ts is calculated as,
i )=(2b i ) (i = 1; 2; : : : ; n) denotes division D i 's Stackelberg equilibrium when division U does not cooperate with any downstream division; andQ(q)
i ). We then compute the characteristic value (pro…t surplus achieved by C r k ) as v(C r k ) = (k;r) ^ (k;r) , which can speci…ed as in (6) . Since p
) are the global solution maximizing (k;r) , we can conclude that (k;r) ^ (k;r) and v(C r k ) 0. Proof of Theorem 3. Since, if a cooperative game's characteristic function is supermodular, then the game must be convex and superadditive, we next need to show the supermodularity. Using Driessen's approach [4] , we should prove that v(
We can easily …nd that, if division U does not belong to C 2 , then this division is not in the coalition S 1 , and thus v(
Next, we consider the case in which division U is in the coalition S 1 . This means that division U is also in S 2 . W.l.o.g., we assume that S 1 and S 2 are k 1 and k 2 division coalitions with k 2 k 1 . Using Theorem 2, we …nd that
which is non-negative, because, as Corollary 1 indicates, [p
) is an increasing, convex function. In (13), 2 is de…ned as,
is an increasing and convex function, as indicated in Corollary 1. The term 3 in (13) is de…ned as,
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where is non-negative according to Corollary 1.
In conclusion, the characteristic function of this game is supermodular, and thus, the game is convex and superadditive.
Proof of Theorem 4. This theorem follows from the superadditivity of our (n+1)-division cooperative game (which is shown in Theorem 3). More speci…cally, we assume that all divisions form z (z 2) disjoint, less-than-(n + 1)-division but non-empty coalitions C 0 1 ; C 0 2 ; : : : ; C 0 z ; that is, C 0 i 6 = ? and C 0 i C n+1 , for i = 1; 2; : : : ; z; C 0 i \ C 0 j = ?, for i; j = 1; 2; : : : ; z, i 6 = j; and [ z i=1 C 0 i = C n+1 . Thus, the total pro…t surpluses achieved by all divisions in the coalitions C 0 i (i = 1; 2; : : : ; z) is
, which is no more than v(C n+1 ), because the cooperative game is superadditive according to Theorem 3. This proves the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5. In order to calculate Shapley value, we need to identify all possible coalitions that each division joins. Next, we consider division D j , j = 1; 2; : : : ; n, and calculate Shapley value y D j for this division. When division D j does not cooperate with any other divisions but joins the one-division coalition (D j ), we …nd from Section 2.
If division D j cooperates with one or more of the other downstream divisions to form a coalition, we then need to consider whether or not division U is also in the coalition since, as discussed previously, the characteristic value of a coalition that does not include the U is zero. Therefore, if division D j joins the coalition S (i.e., D j 2 S) but division U does not join S (i.e., U = 2 S), then we have v(S) v(S fD j g) = 0. We next compute the value of v(S) v(S fD j g), where S includes division U (i.e., U 2 S) and it is a possible coalition that division D j joins. Assume that S is a k-division coalition C k (U; D j ) (2 k n + 1) that includes U , D j and, if k 3, one or more of the other downstream divisions. Note that there are C where v(C r k (U; D j )) and v(C r k (U; D j ) fD j g) can be calculated by using (6). The Shapley value y i (i = D 1 ; D 2 ; : : : ; D n ) is thus calculated as in (7) . Since P i2C n+1 y i = v(C n+1 ), we easily …nd that the Shapley value for division U is y U = v(C n+1 ) P n j=1 y D j . Since our (n + 1)-division cooperative game is convex as shown in Theorem 3, the Shapley value must be in the core.
Proof of Theorem 6. Since the allocation to division i is y i , for i = U; D 1 ; D 2 ; : : : ; D n , we can …nd that (p Proof of Corollary 2. We consider the case that the upstream division U and (k 1) downstream divisions (e.g., D j , j = 1; 2; : : : ; k 1)-who are now in the coalition C k -decide to cooperate the downstream division D k , and thus form a (k + 1)-division coalition C k+1 . Using (6) we can write the characteristic value v(C k+1 ) as 
which is non-negative according to Corollary 1. More precisely, from Corollary 1, we …nd that [p 
which is non-negative, according to Corollary 1. It also follows from Corollary 1 that both the third
